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REVIEW ESSAY
A NEW STANDARD FOR THE USE OF FORCE?
Lawrence J. Korb
Barnett, Thomas P. M. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and
Peace in the Twenty-first Century. New York: Putnam, 2004.
320pp. $26.95
From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the collapse of the twin towers in 2001
to the present, after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the United States has
not had a consistent national security policy that enjoyed the support of the
American people and its allies. This situation is markedly different from the
Cold War era, when our nation had a clear, coherent, widely supported strategy
that focused on containing and deterring Soviet Communist expansion.
The tragic events of 9/11, the increase in terrorist attacks, and possible threats
from such countries as North Korea and Iran that are capable of developing
weapons of mass destruction make it imperative to develop a new national secu-
rity strategy to safeguard the United States. In The Pentagon’s New Map: War and
Peace in the Twenty-first Century, Thomas Barnett, a senior strategic researcher
and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, attempts to provide one.
Unfortunately, he does not succeed. The failure of Barnett’s strategy is most
vividly demonstrated by the strategic rationale he offers for the Bush adminis-
tration’s poorly planned invasion and occupation of Iraq.
According to Barnett, the world is divided into two parts, the Functioning
Core and the Non-Integrating Gap. The Functioning Core consists of those sta-
ble countries in North America, much of South Amer-
ica, the European Union, Russia, Japan, China, India,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. There is
little threat of war or widespread violence in the
Core, because its members enjoy the benefits of
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globalization, specifically rising standards of living. The Gap, on the other hand,
consists of areas such as the Caribbean Rim, most of Africa, the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast
Asia. In those areas there is a great deal of violence and turmoil, because they are
not connected to the Core. This lack of connectivity results from the rejection of
modernity by the elites in the Gap. Therefore, the members of the Gap do not
enjoy the benefits of globalization, and hence these areas become incubators for
terrorists.
If the United States wants to win the war against terrorism, Barnett argues, it
must take the lead in shrinking the Gap. To do this, it must export security to the
Gap until it is ready to integrate into the Core, or else the Gap will continue to
export terrorism to the Core. Barnett calls this a “global transaction strategy.”
His global transaction strategy makes the war against Iraq a war of necessity,
not one of choice. According to Barnett, the invasion of Iraq was justified be-
cause “Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime was dangerously disconnected from the
globalizing world—from our rule sets, our norms, and all the ties that bind the
Core together in mutually assured dependence. He was the Demon of
Disconnectedness and he deserves death for all his sins against humanity over
the years.” Wow!
These words are eerily reminiscent of what President George W. Bush said on
board the USS Abraham Lincoln in May 2003, in his infamous “mission accom-
plished” speech. In remarks onboard the carrier the president claimed that “the
battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11th,
2001” and that the defeat of Saddam Hussein was “a crucial advance in the cam-
paign against terror.”
It does not seem to matter to Barnett or his strategic view that the reasons the
president gave for invading Iraq were spurious or that the war in Iraq repre-
sented a substantial setback in the struggle against al-Qa’ida. The unnecessary
invasion of Iraq not only diverted attention away from Afghanistan, thus dam-
aging the prospects for crippling al-Qa’ida, but created a new justification
among the radical jihadists for attacking Westerners, drained the reservoir of
goodwill that the United States enjoyed in the global community, and in the eyes
of many Muslims transformed the war against terrorism into a war against Islam.
Instead Barnett characterizes the Bush administration’s decision as “amaz-
ingly courageous,” because “it has committed our nation to shrinking a major
portion of the Gap in one fell swoop.” This decision makes the author love and
admire the U.S. government and, by extension, the Bush approach to the global
war on terror.
As a consequence of the framework he has developed, Barnett is also an un-
abashed supporter of Bush’s preemption doctrine when it comes to dealing with
1 5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2005.vp
Thursday, December 09, 2004 2:39:54 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/9
actors and regimes in the Gap. There are two problems with his approach. First,
it confuses preemption with preventive war. It is not only legal under interna-
tional law but moral for a nation to take preemptive military action when it has
what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld calls “elegant intelligence” about an immi-
nent threat. But this is not what the United States did in Iraq. President Bush has
stated repeatedly that Iraq was not an imminent threat, yet he waged a preven-
tive war against what he claimed was “a grave and gathering danger.” If this is the
new standard for the use of force against members of the Gap, what is to prevent
India from waging a preventive war against Pakistan? Or Russia against Georgia?
Second, while Barnett concedes that the traditional strategies of containment
and deterrence will work against other Core states, he argues that it will not work
against members of the Gap. Yet Barnett fails to recognize that while nonstate
actors like al-Qa’ida cannot be deterred, even the most evil regimes in the Gap
can be deterred, because their rulers wish to remain in power. The recent report
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence demonstrates that Iraq was con-
tained and that the sanctions and American and British military pressure helped
to destroy Saddam’s military machine and his capacity to produce conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz testified, the cost of containing Saddam amounted to $2.5 billion a
year. At the time of this writing the Bush administration has spent $144 billion
in Iraq, without making us safer.
Unlike the Bush administration, Barnett does not appear to have learned that
the doctrine of launching preemptive strikes against established states in the
Gap died in Iraq. Barnett wants to launch a preventive war against North Korea.
According to his analysis, Kim Jong Il has become “globalization’s enemy num-
ber one following Saddam Hussein’s demise and must be removed from power.”
He believes that Bush’s reelection means that such action is inevitable.
Finally, Barnett’s analysis falls into the trap of thinking that terrorists in the
Gap attack the West for what it is and what it thinks. However, as demonstrated
in the book Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror by Anony-
mous (a twenty-three-year CIA veteran), America is hated and attacked for what
it does—that is, the policies it pursues that impact the Islamic world, such as its
support for apostate, corrupt, and tyrannical Muslim governments. He notes
that “the Islamic World is not so offended by our democratic system of politics,
guaranties of personal rights and civil liberties, and separation of church and
state that it is willing to wage war against overwhelming odds to stop America
from voting, speaking freely, and praying or not, as they wish.”
Because of these failings, Barnett’s global transaction strategy will not gain
the support of the American people or its allies that containment did. Rather,
the global transaction strategy is in reality an updated version of the domino
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theory, which led the United States to believe that if it did not intervene to pre-
vent South Vietnam from becoming communist, all of Southeast Asia would be-
come part of the Soviet empire. Just as the domino theory led successive
American presidents to commit national blood and treasure to a peripheral
cause that was not essential to the goal of containing Soviet communist expan-
sionism, the invasion of Iraq, even though it is a member of the Gap, was not es-
sential to winning the struggle against radical jihadists like al-Qa’ida.
Unfortunately, these conceptual weaknesses undermine some of the sensible
recommendations that Barnett makes, particularly about U.S. force structure.
Yet even the best organized and equipped military will be of little use if it is em-
ployed incorrectly.
For those looking for a twenty-first-century version of containment, I recom-
mend Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leader-
ship. The “Global Balkans,” which he identifies as a source of political instability,
is similar to Barnett’s Gap. However, Brzezinski shows how the self-defeating ar-
rogance of the Bush administration has undermined what must be the Ameri-
can goal of creating a new global system based on shared interests.
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